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THE LISBON STRATEGY : WHICH FAILURE ?




Pessimistic comments are crowding the medias about the failure of the Lisbon
strategy. At the end of 2004, the latest Kok group's report has emphasized "the
failure of the Lisbon strategy". There is now a debate about the remodeling or the
rationalization of the strategy. Before taking decisions, it would be opportune to
organize a reflection about the extent of the failure and its causes. Otherwise any
reform runs the risk of being not adapted or even counterproductive.
Different questions must be examined : what is the real competitiveness problem ? is
there a real need of an EU initiative ? do the different characteristics of the approach
chosen in 2000 make sense ?
1.  THE PROJECT : A GLOBAL STRATEGY
In March 2000, the European Council gave the EU a new and ambitious goal: to
become by 2010 the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and
greater social cohesion. In light of the United States' and China’s level of growth,
Europe had no other choice, its viability being at stake. To achieve this 2010
objective, the European Council
2 took on a broad commitment to achieve results in
three different domains: the economy, the social protection and the environment.
Actually,  the  Lisbon  strategy   (extended  in  Stockholm  in  2001)  concentrates
practically on all EU activities being linked to one of those three fields
3. To ensure a
better cohesion of the reforms at each level, a new open method of coordination was
developed.  Moreover,  a  spring  council  was  mandated  to  follow  up  the
implementation of the strategy.
One must not underestimate the strong innovative characteristics of this decision.
The Lisbon strategy does not resemble any fundamental program of action launched
                                                
1  T. ZGAJEWSKI is director of HERA and senior researcher at the University of Liège. K. HAJJAR is
researcher at the Royal Institute of International Relations. This comment is personal and does not engage the
responsibility of the institutions to which the authors belong.
This paper has been realized in the context of a research program sponsored by the French Community of
Belgium (Direction Générale de l’enseignement non obligatoire et de la recherche scientifique, Ministère de
l’éducation, de la recherche et de la formation).
2 European Council of Lisbon, march 2000.
3 One will find an interesting background of the conceptual reflection which preceded the launch of the strategy
in  M.J.  RODRIGUES  ed.,  The  new  knowledge  economy  in  Europe  –  A  strategy  for  international
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by the EC in the past, like the single market or the single currency. The scope of
action is much broader and the method is very different.
1.1. Towards a competitive, dynamic and knowledge-based Economy
Two evolutions presently modify the European society: the globalization of the
economy coupled with the growing emergence of information and communications
new  technologies.  To  seize  on  the  incredible  sources  of  innovation  offered,
necessary progresses must be launched.
Firstly, the new economy relies heavily on information. In this context, information
needs to be largely distributed to all, companies and citizens, to allow them to
become  credible  actors  in  the  knowledge  economy.  Thus,  strong  means  of
communication are necessary to be enhanced to reach this aim, among others,
Internet,  e-money,  mobile  telecommunications.  Strong  contents  must  also  be
elaborated.
Secondly, research needs to be seriously coordinated at the European level. Being
one  of  the  only  ways  to  improve  at  the  same  time  the  economic  growth,  the
employment and social cohesion, this has been forgotten, placing Europe far away
from United States. Aiming also at avoiding the evasion of brains, a European Area
of Research and Innovation will provide the missing frame for researchers.
Thirdly, Europe has the objective to become the best competitive area in the world.
To reach this goal, a friendly business climate helps to its implementation. By
consequence,  administrative  rules  leading  to  the  creation  of  companies  and
especially SMEs ought to be simplified.
Fourthly, the full implementation of the internal market is required for the best
functioning of the economy. Therefore, goods, persons, services and capital must
circulate freely, all existing barriers being removed.  Moreover, the financial markets
integration benefits from the circulation of the euro, boosting the competition.
1.2. The modernization of the European Social model
To create the knowledge economy, another core concept of the Strategy is the
enhancement of the working and living conditions of the European population
4. The
argument is that a flexible social protection system, far from being an impediment to
growth, facilitates it.
Firstly,  a  better  level  of  education  and  training  is  essential  to  revitalize  the
employment. In this view, the educational system must be re-organized to increase
the knowledge of a higher number of persons, to enlarge the participation of women
in the working society. Secondly, unemployment is to be lowered down to meet the
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demands of the new economy. An active employment policy is developed, allowing
an improvement of the European social model and an increasing of opportunities.
Thirdly, social exclusion and poverty are to be fought. Again, the best approach is to
favor the access of employment opportunities and knowledge to all.
1.3. The environmental perspective
To ensure the equilibrium between economic growth and ecological considerations,
the Lisbon Strategy is completed by an environmental dimension. Thus, a new
objective of sustainable development is introduced, based on the principle that every
possible consequence is examined before a decision is taken.
In this view, the focus is set on specific priority domains. Those are the climate
change, the viable ecological transport, the health security and the reduction of
polluted means via the responsible administration of natural resources. Among
others, greenhouse gas emissions are to be lowered down and clean technologies
promoted.
1.4. The systematization of the open method of coordination
Instead of harmonizing national legislations, the European Council concentrates on a
new form of cooperation between EU and the Member States. Common targets are
preferred to binding rules. The advantage is to allow Member States to develop
progressively their own policies, with more choice regarding the instruments and
means.
Several steps lead to the coordination of all national procedures. First, guidelines are
fixed  by  the  Union  with  specific  timetables,  even  outside  the  EU  exclusive
competences. Secondly, Member States implement those objectives via national
actions plans. Thirdly, Qualitative and Quantitative indicators constitute the peer
review to measure successes and failures by Member States. Grouped within 6
categories
5,  those  measurement  instruments  are  examined  in  each  European
Council follow-up of the Lisbon Strategy. Among them are found Structural Indicators
such as the Gross Domestic Product, the General government debt, the employment
rate,  the  general  price  levels,  the  level  of  education  or  the  greenhouse  gas
emissions. Fourthly, a name and shame approach complements the monitoring of
the national actions.
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2. A MID-TERM EVALUATION SURROUNDED BY A LOT OF CONFUSION
Since the  launch of  the  Strategy, several Spring Councils have examined the
progress of the strategy. All of them analyzed the positive and negative results of its
implementation. At the end of the Prodi Commission, a more general evaluation
began. It was symbolized by the presentation of the Kok’s report at the end of 2004.
Finally, at the beginning of 2005, the Barroso Commission presented a reoriented
strategy.  It  is  especially  interesting  to  observe  the  progressive  drift  of  official
language in the succession of documents
6.
2.1. The results remain limited
2.1.1.  Some objectives have been met
Since the 2000 European Council, some reforms have been accomplished and some
targets reached. Jobs have been created, boosting the total employment rate to
reach  64,3  %  in  2003.  With  regard  to  the  feminine  employment  rate,  it  has
progressed up to 56% in 2003. Moreover, the Information society is in expansion
with the enlargement of Internet accessible facilities. Schools, Universities and
Administrations are more and more empowered with computers and Internet access.
Several markets - among others, electricity and telecommunications - have been
opened to competition since 2000. The sustainability of the environment becomes a
key to be taken into account in every decision-making.
Moreover, structural reforms have been progressively introduced in many Member
States. Flexibility of employment is slowly improving. Social protection systems have
been reformed, sometimes against significant opposition (France’s pensions reform
in 2002, Germany’s unemployment coverage reform in 2004).
2.1.2.  The most fundamental objectives have not been met
Nevertheless, if some progresses are recognized since 2000, an extremely long way
remains to be stridden to achieve the objectives for 2010. Delays appear especially
important in two domains. The first one concerns the objectives for the employment.
Neither the 70 % general employment rate nor the 50% 55-64 aged workers rate will
be achieved in 2010.  Furthermore, a second objective is not yet ready to be met: the
research and development structural indicator. It was supposed to reach 3% of GDP
spending for R & D, but the majority of Member States remains far from it.
Moreover, the target relating to the digital training of teachers is also out of reach. As
long as other areas are concerned, the progresses are discouraging. Member States
continue to fail transposing EU internal market directives.
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Some social and environmental targets have also been missed. It is interesting to
notice  that  this  fact  is  hardly  mentioned.  Social  exclusion  has  in  fact  been
progressing in some aspects during the last years
7. In the environmental context, the
Kyoto  protocol  and  its  greenhouse  gas  emissions  target  is  far  from  being
implemented. Various forms of pollution have in fact been increasing in the last
years
8. Therefore, the happy enthusiasm of the beginning has progressively been
replaced by the realization of the impossibility to meet the proposed targets.
2.2. The Kok report : nothing new under the sun
At the end of 2004, a group presided by W. Kok
9 has suggested giving a new chance
to the Lisbon Strategy. To achieve this would firstly require European Institutions and
Member States “to commit themselves”. It is worthwhile to study where the Kok
report emphasizes continuity and change.
One striking element of the Kok report is the fact that it does not question any basic
element of the Lisbon strategy : neither its objectives, nor its global approach, nor its
large use of the open coordination method. What appears wrong, basically, is the
weakness of the will. The reading of the report generates the strong suspicion that its
authors preferred not to deal with the fundamental questions generated by the
reform's failure.
2.2.1.  Lines of continuity
                                                
7 See CEC, Joint report on social inclusion, 2004. “Despite an overall improvement since 1995, the numbers
affected by relative income poverty are still very significant with more than 55 million people or 15 % of the EU
population living at risk of poverty in 2001 (p.6).  “There are a number of trends that seem to be increasingly
common in several countries. Unemployment levels are increasing overall. In some countries in spite of more
positive developments in relation to unemployment relatively high income gaps have persisted (IRL, UK). The
numbers dependent on minimum income schemes tend to increase. In terms of accommodation there are
indications that housing waiting lists have grown and there is a tendency for homelessness to increase. While
overall health standards have been largely maintained there has been some indication of an increase in mental
health problems and in problems related to addiction. (p. 33).
8 See EEA, Europe’s environment : the third assessment, 2003. “Despite (the) relative decoupling of resource
use from economic growth, in absolute terms, material use still remains at unsustainable high levels with regard
to both its volume and its structure ». (p. 15). Energy efficiency improved, but in western Europe this was not
enough to prevent further growth in total energy consumption (p. 24). « After some recovery in the mid-1990s,
deterioration has resumed in recent years with more than 20 % of trees now classified as damaged (p. 52).
« Transport energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in Europe are now growing strongly along with
traffic  volumes  after  a  drop  in  the  early  1990s  in  central  and  eastern  Europe  and  EECCA  »  (p.  74).
Eutrophication remains a substantial problem with large areas unprotected throughout Europe especially in
western Europe and central and eastern Europe. Furthermore, most of the monitored vegetation and agricultural
crops in western Europe and central and eastern Europe are exposed to ozone concentrations above the long-
term European Union target. Air pollution remains a problem in most cities. Long-term average ground-level
ozone concentrations continue to increase although short-term peak concentrations are falling. Exposure to
particulate matter may be the largest potential health problem from air pollution in most cities » (p. 117). « Total
waste generation has been decoupled from economic growth in a limited number of countries. Agreed objectives
to stabilise the generation of municipal waste in the European Union have not yet been met. Quantities are
increasing in most western European countries and to a lesser extent in most central and eastern European
countries and the countries of EECCA » (p. 151).
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Moreover, the group urges actions to be undertaken in five areas of policy. The
knowledge society remaining the priority, Europe must increase its attractiveness for
researchers and boost at the same time the R&D expenses and the use of ICTs.
With regard to the internal market, further actions towards the completion of the free
movement of goods, capital and services are required. To enhance the business
climate, the simplification of rules regarding the start-up and functioning of the
companies remains the preponderant key. Strategies towards a lifelong leaning and
active ageing will improve the labour market. Policies pursuing the environmental
sustainability should be promoted.
According to the group of experts, the failure to meet the targets defined in 2000 is
principally due to the incapacity of Member States to adopt coordinated measures to
promote the good application of the Lisbon strategy. Therefore, the experts propose
to increase the coherence and consistency between the various national policies to
reach a higher level of fulfillment of the objectives.
2.2.2.  Lines of change
The main change in the report lies in the very limited importance given to the social
and environmental objectives of the strategy. The social problems are analyzed
nearly exclusively from the point of view of employment. All other social problems are
not evoked. The environmental problems are mentioned in one paragraph.
Another change in the report lies in the suggestion to enhance the role to the
Member States preparing national programs complying with the fixed objectives.
Nevertheless, there is not much analysis regarding the reasons of their failure until
now.
Moreover, the Kok report does not really offer any concrete proposition to make the
Lisbon Strategy work. If it analyses partly the reasons why the Strategy fails to
deliver, it does not provide any solution allowing an improvement of the Lisbon
pillars.  The  group  of  experts  was  thus  mainly  unsuccessful.  Apart  from  some
omissions and the underlining of the malfunction of the Strategy, nothing very new is
contained  in  its  report.  Therefore,  taking  back  the  mission  of  the  group,  the
fundamental elements of the strategy must be scrutinized to discover where the
causes of this failure lie.Lisbon Strategy TZ KH 22032005 7
2.3. The new propositions of the Commission : more of the same ambiguity
2.3.1.  A few novelties
In February 2005, the Barroso Commission presented its propositions for “a new
start for the Lisbon strategy”
10. Its communication provoked various reactions in the
European Parliament, the Member States and the civil society. The development of
this debate was quite surprising in some ways. Three changes were noticeable – and
one noticed.
Firstly, though the text expressed generous intentions about the European social and
environmental model, precise social and environmental targets had in fact been
abandoned.  Paradoxically,  the  speech  of  the  Commission’s  president  in  the
European Parliament was clearer about this than the communication itself
11.
A  few  days  later,  the  Commission  presented  other  documents,  which  partly
compensated this change. The first one was a new social agenda
12. It was only a
partial compensation since, despite indicating interest for poverty and minimal
income, it stopped short of defining precise targets. Two other documents covered
environment. One defined the new environmental program for 2005, and the other
explored possible strategies for global warming after 2012
13.
This novelty seems bound to create a lot of negative reactions. It is especially
curious if one considers the weak administrative burden and the weak political
obstacles that these social and environmental objectives have generated during the
last five years. It seems impossible to identify one single measure targeted in the
Lisbon  strategy  in  2000  which  has  been  blocked  because  of  the  social  and
environmental objectives. The additional problems that this novelty is bound to
create are thus much more obvious than its advantages.
Secondly, another new element, less noticed, was a much stronger emphasis in the
Lisbon strategy on the growth and stability pact. This is quite a logical development,
considering that the pact is the first pillar of economic coordination. Nevertheless,
curiously, this linkage had been quite forgotten during the Prodi Commission.
Thirdly, during the presentation of the communication (but not in the communication
itself),  another  linkage  was  established,  this  time  with  the  future  financial
                                                
10 COM (2005) 24.
11 There was one revealing metaphor in the speech pronounced 2 February 2005 in the European Parliament. “It
is as if I have three children – the economy, our social agenda and the environment. Like any modern father – if
one of my children is sick, I’m ready to drop everything and focus on him until he is back to health. That is
normal and responsible. But that does not mean I love the others any less !” This comparison is enlightening in
more than one way. First, it indicates quite clearly the will to give priority to economic objectives. Second, it
relies on the hypothesis that the social protection and the environment are in good health in Europe, which could
be debated considering the Commission’s latest reports on these subjects. The most dangerous aspect of such an
emphasis is that it suggests the abandonment of the social and environmental objectives could have been the
result of a personal involvement of the president.
12 COM (2005) 35.
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perspectives  of  the  Union.  Here  too,  this  is  quite  a  logical  development.
Nevertheless, this had not been done in the past and, considering the present
aggressiveness surrounding the budget negotiation, is quite courageous.
2.3.2.  Much continuity
Nevertheless,  apart  from  the  reduction  of  the  objectives,  the  Commission’s
communication does not change much in the approach. This remains a very broad
strategy. It still mixes competences from the EC and the Member States. It still relies
basically on the open method of coordination. It does not propose anything new
about the legislative process or the coordination of economic policies at the level of
the EC. A lot of importance is given to rather modest objectives, like reducing the
load of papers, having debates in the national Parliaments and the civil society, and
nominating a Mr (or Mrs) Lisbon in each Member State.
2.3.3.  A rather confusing communication
Revealingly, the communications were not very clear, and sometimes contradictory
about the causes of the “Lisbon’s strategy failure”. For example, according to the
press release, the president of the Commission indicated that ‘the Lisbon goals were
right but the implementation was poor”. Nevertheless, in the next sentence, he
indicated  that  “we  must  refocus  the  agenda”.  Then,  in  the  next  sentence,  he
concluded that “I believe we have the right tools to achieve our goals”
14. The first and
third sentences seem to indicate that the problem came from the process, but the
second from the goals themselves.
Furthermore, the same document lists a lot of different causes of the failure :
“economic conditions, international certainty, slow progress in the Member States
and a gradual loss of political focus”. None of them seemed directly linked to the
process or the goals of the Strategy. According to another document, “we need to
revamp the Lisbon strategy because the delivery process which has become too
complicated and is poorly understood. It generates much paper, but little action.
Responsibilities between the national and the European level have become blurred.
Limited ownership of the Member states is the result”
15.
All this is rather confusing, especially if one considers that the improvement of
political communication is precisely one important element of the “new start”. The
description of the causes of the Lisbon’s strategy failure is everything but clear, and
so is the description of the components of the renewed strategy.
                                                
14 IP/005/130, 2 February 2005.
15 MEMO/05/34, 2 February 2005 (“Q+A: a new start for the Lisbon strategy”).Lisbon Strategy TZ KH 22032005 9
3. THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS : WHAT ARE THE ROLE
AND THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE EU ?
3.1. What is the extent of the EU competitiveness problem?
3.1.1. The apparent problems
•  The US grows more, but there is practically no difference in the GDP growth
per work hour.
Many comments have been written about Europe’s weak competitiveness compared
to the United States’. Most of them deserve a very careful attention. Firstly, the
object of comparison is not always clear : the Eurozone, the EU-15, the EU-25.
Secondly, there are important divergences in the statistical approach between the
USA and the EU, notably about the integration of software costs (which is considered
as an investment in the USA and not in the EU)). Thirdly, things are very different
whether one compares growth of GDP, growth of GDP per capita, growth of GDP per
hour of work, and standards of life. To summarize long discussions, a comparison of
the growth between per hour of work indicates that the difference between the USA
and the Eurozone is minimal (2,1 % in place of 1,8 %), and is entirely due to
Germany  (without  Germany,  there  is  absolutely  no  difference).  The  difference
between the absolute level of GDP growth can largely be explained by strongest
currents of migration (the USA population grows, the Eurozone's not)  and by the
strong reduction of working time in Europe.
•  The US' growth has been partly bought with an Himalaya of debt
The deficit of external current payments is more or less endemic in the USA.
Furthermore, since 2000, this has strongly increased because of the growing public
deficit. The sparing capacity of the American economy is presently more or less
inexistent. The households' debt is tremendous, the public debt is quickly rising, and
so is the external debt (if one takes into consideration environmental costs, the US
growth appears still more costly).
•  The Eurozone has survived a 35 % devaluation of the dollar towards the Euro
during the period 2002-2004.
It  is  often  said  that  the  European  economy  has  no  adaptation  capability.
Nevertheless, the Eurozone has absorbed a very strong rise of the Euro during the
last  two  years  (especially  strong  if  one  considers  that  most  other  important
economies have linked their currency to the dollar). After these two years, growth
was still at 1,8 % and the trade balance was even still positive. This is an impressing
result, even if it has caught very little attention. This contrasts quite positively with the
image of total inadaptability of the European economy.
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Even  if  the  problems  of  the  European  economy  remain  relative,  they  are
nevertheless real.
•  The spending linked to the ageing of the European population is constantly
growing
The most important problem Europe has to face is demographic change. Since 1960,
the growth of the European Union population is irremediably falling down
16. This
decline is explained by three main different combined trends. The first two ratios, the
downfall of the fertility rate and the higher life expectancy at birth, are closely linked
and cumulatively contribute to the greying of the European population. However, in
United States, those ratios are still maintained at a high equilibrium.   Moreover,
another ratio is rising deeply in Europe, the old-age dependency ratio
17. Indeed, in
the 55-64-age grade, almost 60 % do not work anymore in the EU-25 zone. By
consequence, because of the ageing, public expenditures are estimated to increase
of  8  %  GDP  between  2000  and  2050
18.  Therefore, the  greying of  population
combined with early retirements will have disastrous consequences on the European
economy
19.
In  light  of  those  data,  the  European  social  model  appears  more  and  more
inadequate. To  cope  with  the  higher expenditures, Europe  must  be  extremely
productive
20. If nothing is done to counteract the effects of the ageing of population,
the European Social model will collapse sooner than expected.
•  The progress of European productivity is decreasing
The second challenge Europe has to face is the enhancing of new information and
communication technologies. Indeed, the introduction of ICT has the power to
revolutionize the workplace by boosting productivity, increasing wages and improving
living standards. Europe has thus a golden opportunity to seize to grow
21.
However, if the diffusion of ICT was particularly successful in United States, it is not
the case in Europe
22. Despite the promotion of the knowledge based economy by the
Commission, more remains to be done. The European slowness can be mostly
explained  by  the  rigidity  of  its  labour  markets,  which  leads  to  long-term
unemployment among unskilled workers. According to the Sapir Report, the existing
                                                
16 Eurostat yearbook 2004, growth of the EU-25 population, p 41.
17 Eurostat, central scenario projections; old-age dependency ratio: population aged 65 or more, over population
aged 15-64.
18 European Commission, The EU Economy 2002 Review, European Economy No. 6.
19 For a global analysis of the pensions' problem, see for example R. HOLZMANN, M.ORENSTEIN, M.
RUTKOWSKI eds., Pension Reform in Europe: Process and Progress, Washington : World Bank, 2003. For an
interesting perspective on healthcare in 2050, see E. SCHULTZ, Ageing, health and retirement in Europe,
ENEPRI research report nº 4, 2005.
20 This factor will be analysed in the next section.
21 See C. DENIS, K. MCMORROW, W. ROGER and R. VEUGELEERS, The Lisbon strategy and the EU's
structural productivity problem, Economic papers nº 221, Brussels : European Commission, 2005.
22 There are here interesting lessons to be drawn from the US use of ICT in a broad specter of activities : see C.
DENIS, K. MCMORROW and W. ROGER, An analysis of EU and US productivity developments, Economic
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barriers in product and financial markets slow down the diffusion of ICT. Moreover,
the apparition of new technologies contributes to change completely the working
society. By consequence, in-depth reforms are indispensable. However, it is where it
hurts. Up to now, Europe remains incapable of restructuring its traditional companies
and its administration. Indeed, it requires a total modification of the way to work,
which, like every change, is seen as a threat by the majority. In appearance,
companies have adopted new technologies: workers are equipped with computers
and Internet, have access to a higher quantity of information. Nonetheless, they
continue to work as usually, as when technologies had not been yet propagated. In
conclusion, more than a change of material structures, an evolution of mentalities is
needed.
Therefore, it is timely to address this problem by optimising the development of ICT
in Europe. If not, it will become increasingly difficult to sustain the social model.
•  The level of activity remains unsatisfactory
The decrease of unemployment and the participation rate remain quite weak. This is
one central problem if one desires to finance the growing needs of the "European
social model". Something has to be done. Progresses have been made in some
Member States but they are clearly insufficient.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that a solution to this problem requires a global
approach,  combining  EU  and  national  measures,  macroeconomic  and
microeconomic incentives, economic and social initiatives, added flexibility and new
forms of social protection
23. From this point of view, it could be said that the scope of
the Lisbon strategy is not broad enough yet.
•  The regulatory landscape sometimes inhibits growth
In some Member States, the regulatory system has become in itself a substantial
impediment to company and innovation. The multiplication of heavy administrative
procedures often uncoordinated provokes additional costs and delays. There is thus
a clear need for simplification of regulations and administrative procedures.
•  New competitors arise on the international market
In a world of free trade and free movement, new powerful actors have emerged:
China and India. They benefit from low labor costs, and they gradually incorporate
new technologies. This engenders new competitive pressures, especially in old
economic sectors, like textile or steel. There is thus a need of re-adaptation, both for
products  and  people.  Nevertheless,  this  evolution  also  generates  new  trade
opportunities and  new  benefits for  consumers. But  it  cannot  be  denied that  it
imposes deep restructurations in specific economic sectors.
3.2.     Is a European program necessary ?
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According to the principle of subsidiarity
24, the European Community can only act if a
problem cannot be adequately dealt by the Member States acting on their own. It is
only possible when the contemplated action is better achieved by the Community
institutions. Moreover, it must be among the shared competences between Member
States and the EC
25. Since the 1980s, the importance of the subsidiarity principle
has constantly grown. Each Community action is now scrupulously screened before
being undertaken. It is thus puzzling to discover that a lot of actions contemplated in
the Lisbon strategy concern zones of competence remaining at least partly to the
Member States : employment, environment, social policies, education. Direct EC
initiatives in these domains are certainly limited.
This situation explains the creation of the open method of coordination. The method
has become a bridge allowing the definition of a global strategy covering partly areas
outside the harmonizing competence of the EC. The repartition of competences
between the EC and Member States constrains them to organize something complex
to support a global strategy.
A European program is certainly necessary to deal with measures in the area of the
EC competences. It is also necessary, though it is less obvious, for other measures.
This can be explained both by technical and political reasons. Technically, there are
links between these different measures. To be efficient, for example, macroeconomic
policy needs structural reforms. Otherwise, its effects are quickly lost in the sands of
economic inflexibility. Structural reforms need mechanisms of social protection.
Otherwise, fears quickly bring a stalemate in the process of structural reform.
Politically,  the  EC  decision  process  requires  some  kind  of  balance  between
economic and social objectives.
There are thus clear links between the different characteristics of the Lisbon strategy.
To be efficient, it needs to be global. To be global, it needs to cover competences of
both the EC and the Member States. To cover some competences of the Member
States, it needs to rely on a suppler instrument. But, of course, in these domains, the
EU has absolutely no capacity to deliver the goods.
A  second  important  argument  concerns  more  specifically  the  members  of  the
Eurozone (though all members of the EU have in fact a strong interest in the good
functioning of the Eurozone). The European Central Bank has a constitutional duty to
protect the stability of prices. There is a direct link between the stability of prices and
the efficiency of the economy as a whole. If competition and budget management are
good, this gives more autonomy to the central bank to practice a stimulating policy
for growth without running the risk of increasing inflation. One could thus analyze the
rise of the open coordination method as a way to correct the original macroeconomic
deficiencies of the Maastricht Treaty
26.
                                                
24 Article 5, second paragraph (3b) ECT, in conjunction with Article 2 (B), last paragraph, and the 12th recital in
the preamble to the EUT.
25 According to art. 5 ECT, this principle does not concern the exclusive competences of the Community. This
has no implication here.
26  See  F.  DEHOUSSE  ,  Commentaire  sur  les  articles  3A  et  102  A  à  109  du  traité  de  Rome,  in  V.
CONSTANTINESCO, R. KOVAR et D. SIMON dirs., Le traité sur l'Union européenne, Paris : Economica, 1995,
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3.3. Were there real results at the EU level ?
It must be emphasized that the Lisbon strategy has been quite a success – at the EU
level. Thanks to the Community method, a lot of legislative measures which had
been announced in 2000 have in fact been taken during the last four years. On the
reverse, the results of the coordination of economic policies, seen from a more
general point of view, have been less impressive.
This distinction is important. It indicates that, at the EU level, the delivery problem
has been provoked by the drift from the Community method to the coordination
method, which is less constraining. The core of the problem thus goes back to the
Maastricht Treaty, which decided at that time not to use the pure Community method
in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union. It could be foreseen at the time
that such a drift could provoke future problems in the management of EMU. Financial
markets  need  a  certain  level  of  certainty,  which  cannot  be  offered  by  the
procrastination of the Council in the adoption of sanctions
27.
3.3.1.  A lot of legislative measures have been adopted
Without detailing the impact of the measures, it is important to realize that most of
the commitments taken in 2000 have in fact been fulfilled. Quite curiously, the only
neglected sector from this point of view has been the consumer protection. It is very
surprising that such an important fact has not been emphasized during the debate on
the Lisbon’s strategy results.
These results concern mainly some network activities whose opening to competition
had remained persistently slow during the building of the single market program, like
the energy policy
28, the postal services
29, the single European sky
30, and various
                                                
27 Ibidem.
28 See for example the following directives of the European Parliament and of the Council : Directive 2003/54
EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92 EC -Statements
made with regard to decommissioning and waste management activities (OJ 2003, L 176); Directive 2003/55
EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30 EC (OJ 2003,
L 176) ; Directive 2001/77 EC on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the
internal electricity market (OJ 2001, L 283); Directive 1228/2003 EC on conditions for access to the network for
cross-border exchanges in electricity (OJ 2003, L 176); Decision 1229/2003 EC laying down a series of
guidelines  for  trans-European  energy  networks  and  repealing  Decision  1254/96  EC  (OJ 2003, L 176);
Regulation 807/2004 EC amending Council Regulation 2236/95 EC laying down general rules for the granting
of Community financial aid in the field of trans-European networks (OJ 2004,  L 143).
29 See Directive 2002/39 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 97/67 EC with
regard to the further opening to competition of Community postal services (OJ 2002,  L 176).
30 See Regulation 549/2004 EC laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the
framework Regulation) (OJ 2004, L 96); Regulation 550/2004 EC on the provision of air navigation services in
the single European sky (the service provision Regulation) (OJ 2004, L 96); Regulation 551/2004 EC on the
organisation and use of the airspace in the single European sky (the airspace Regulation) (OJ 2004, L 96);
Regulation  552/2004  EC  on  the  interoperability  of  the  European  Air  Traffic  Management  network  (the
interoperability Regulation) (OJ 2004,   L 96); Regulation 894/2002 EC amending Council Regulation 95/93
EEC  on  common  rules  for  the  allocation  of  slots  at  Community  airports  (OJ 2002, L 142); Regulation
1554/2003 EC amending Council Regulation 95/93 EEC on common rules for the allocation of slots atLisbon Strategy TZ KH 22032005 14
aspects of transport
31. Nevertheless, other activities have also been neglected such




3.3.2.  The coordination of economic policies remains too weak
The  failure  of  the  Lisbon  strategy  is  compounded  by  the  failure  of  previous
commitments in the realm of economic policy. The EC is of course not very credible
in the delivery of a global coordination strategy if it is not even able to respect older
and more limited coordination commitments.
•  Economic and budget reforms in the Member States have not been properly
coordinated
Though the Maastricht Treaty has established an economic and monetary union, its
economic aspects have remained quite limited. A lot of national reforms in this area
have not been coordinated at all. More worryingly, in the periods of sudden oil price
rises (2000 and 2004), there has been very little common approach of the Member
States.
•  The stability pact has not been enforced
                                                                                                                                                     
Community airports (OJ 2003, L 221); Regulation 793/2004 EC amending Council Regulation 95/93 EEC on
common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports (OJ 2004,  L 138).
31 Directive 2001/12 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 91/440
EEC on the development of the Community railways (OJ 2003, L75); Directive 2004/51 EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 91/440 EEC on the development of the Community's
railways (OJ 2004, L 164); Directive 2001/13 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February
2001 amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings (OJ 2003, L 75); Directive
2001/14 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity
and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification (OJ 2002, L 75);
Directive 2001/16 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the trans-
European conventional rail system (OJ 2001, L 110); Directive 2004/49 EC of the European Parliament and the
Council on safety on the Community's railways and amending Council Directive 95/18 EC on the licensing of
railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14 EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the
levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification (Railway Safety Directive) (OJ
2004, L 164); Regulation 881/2004 EC of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a European
Railway Agency (Agency Regulation) (OJ 2004, L 164); Directive 2004/50 EC of the European Parliament and
the Council amending Council Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-European high-speed rail
system and Directive 2001/16 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the
trans-European conventional rail system (Second Railway Package) (OJ 2004, L 164).
32 Regulation 1/2003 EC on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty (OJ 2003, L 1); Regulation 794/2004 EC implementing Council Regulation 659/1999 EC laying
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 2004, L 140); Regulation 139/2004
EC on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ 2004,  L 024).
33  Directive  2004/17  EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  coordinating  the  procurement
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ 2004, L 134);
Directive 2004/18 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ  2004, L 134);
Decision 2005/15 EC on the detailed rules for the application of the procedure provided for in Article 30 of
Directive 2004/17 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement procedures
of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ 2005,  L7).
34 See Council Resolution on Galileo (OJ 2001, C 157), Regulation 876/2002 EC setting up the Galileo Joint
Undertaking (OJ 2002, L 138); Regulation 1321/2004 EC on the establishment of structures for the management
of the European satellite radio-navigation Programmes, (OJ 2004, L 246).Lisbon Strategy TZ KH 22032005 15
Adopted in 1997, the Stability and Growth pact aims at avoiding damages caused by
debt politics followed by EMU Member State which would impact the whole Euro
Zone.  It  enables  the  continuity  of  the  budgetary  discipline  efforts  after  the
introduction of the single currency, the Euro. The core of the Pact is composed of a
medium-term objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus. This
objective allows Member States to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while
keeping the government deficit within the reference value of 3% GDP. Introduced by
the Maastricht Treaty, this reference value brings economic stability within the whole
Euro Zone.
The Stability and Growth Pact has lost its credibility. Most Member States, and
especially the biggest economies of the Eurozone, are no more following its rules.
From  2001  a  stagnation  period  has  begun.  Many  Member  States  ran  their
economies rather badly, letting increase deficits and debts. In those conditions, the 3
% reference was no more achievable in numerous countries. The middle-term
objective of maintaining a budgetary position close to balance or in surplus seems
now totally out of reach.
In addition to those elements, the Stability and Growth Pact has not provided
adequate answers to repeated breaches of the 3% ceiling. Neither the early warning
procedure,  nor  the  so-called  sanction  procedure  to  be  followed  in  case  of
infringement are working.   Instead of applying sanctions (interest bearing deposit
until the correction), the Council made promise some infringing Member States to
respect the SGP without any other condition. In this situation, the Commission
decided not to take any further steps and to suspend the excessive deficit procedure.
3.4. What is the main cause of failure ?
The present chaotic debate about competences, levels of power, objectives and
processes obscures the main reality : these elements are not the main causes of the
Lisbon strategy's (partial) failure. The real difficulty lies in the reform of the welfare
state. One forgets a little bit quickly that the most important objectives of the strategy
deal  with  fundamental  pillars  of  the  welfare  state  :  pensions,  health  care,
unemployment  support  and  education.  This  is  the  first  time  in  the  European
integration history that these domains are so clearly the focus of action.
This was bound to be difficult in any context, at any level, with any process. A very
clear sign of the central role of the welfare state reform appears in the acuity of
opposition regarding measures in this domain both at the EC level (the directive on
services) and at the national level (pensions and unemployment reform). For the
sake of good communication, it is more than timely to concentrate on this, rather
than on objectives and processes.
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Considering the scope of the failure, it is worth considering the question : does all
this make sense ?
3.5.1. Is the triangular approach viable ?
According to the Kok report, the triangular approach improves each face of the
triangle
35 thanks to the combined action of the two other faces. Other comments
consider that the approach is too broad, and consequently that a lot of energy and
attention is spilled. At the end, according to this vision, having a so large agenda
comes to not having any agenda at all. In 2004 there has been a clear temptation to
minimize the social and environmental aspects of the strategy. This drift is obvious in
the  Kok  report,  which  comprehends  a  lot  of  pages  concerning  the  economic
objectives, one paragraph about the environmental objectives and one line about
social objectives. This can hardly be considered as a balanced approach.
A  broad  agenda  is  certainly  more  complex  to  manage.  This  being  said,  this
complexity reflects only the complexity of the real world.  There were, as has been
said before, technical and political reasons to adopt a global strategy. These reasons
have not disappeared in the meantime. A comparison with the single market and the
single currency is, from this point of view, very enlightening. The single market had
social  and  environmental  components.  This  helped  a  lot  to  boost  its  political
acceptability. The single currency did not have any, and this explains a lot the
reduced political acceptability of the program and the growing unpopularity of the EC
in various countries of the Eurozone. Therefore, the broadness of the agenda finds
both macroeconomic and political justifications.
3.5.2.  Can the Open Method of Coordination deliver ?
Has the open method of coordination delivered ? The answer, surprisingly, is partly
positive.  At the EC level, many announced measures have been adopted. At the
Member  States'  level,  there  has  been  some  movement  –  though  limited.
Nevertheless, at this level, the method was never meant to produce the same results
than a legislative program like the single market, for example. It was conceived to
diffuse information and to stimulate initiatives. On both (limited) aspects, it has
produced the desired effects.
Comparisons  between  Member  States  have  indicated  very  strongly  that  the
performance of communications systems and of the employment policies are much
better in the Nordic countries, for example. They have also shown that pollution has
reached a  more threatening level  in  the  core  countries of  the  EU  than  in  the
periphery. Action has been taken in various employment and social policies, but one
must honestly recognize that these reforms have little to do with the Lisbon strategy
and a lot to do with the perception of the national interest by national governments.
Furthermore, these reforms have had a limited impact until now. Nevertheless, their
impact can only be analyzed in a long term perspective.
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If the impact of the strategy is partly limited, it is because it was meant to be so from
the start
36. If they hoped to obtain more drastic results, the national governments
should have given other means to the EC institutions. In a deliberate political
decision, they chose not to do so.
4. THE LISBON STRATEGY : A REVELATOR OF THE PRESENT EU HUBRIS
Soft law brings soft results. There is nothing surprising in such an outcome. What is
surprising in this context is precisely the surprise of many observers. The next
section examines in a very synthetic way what could have been done.
The Lisbon strategy has been from the beginning a very ambitious program of action
with very limited instruments. From this point of view, it symbolizes unfortunately the
present contradictions of the Member States
37. You cannot have your cake and eat
it. You cannot also have it without bringing a little bit of flour and sugar.
4.1.  New ambitions without any institutional reform
At the EC level, results have been real but limited. It must be noticed that the EC has
been especially late when the decision process was especially complex. Regulations
about patents have not yet been adopted (though already contemplated in 2000…)
because of the unanimity requirement. Directives about taxation of infrastructures, as
a significant rise in the research budget have been paralyzed for the same reason. If
Member States consider that such decisions are urgent (which they are), they should
have the honesty to accept the use of qualified majority voting in these domains. It
must be remembered in this context that the enlargement of 2004 has strongly
increased the difficulty of the EU decision process. The qualified majority of the 25
Member States in the Council is now more difficult to reach than the unanimity of the
15 old Member States. Furthermore, the Nice Treaty has increased the number of
required votes.
The weakness of this approach is evident for example in the field of research. In this
domain, it is essential to improve the level of national spending, but it is at least as
essential to better use the outlays. Otherwise, increased budgets will not generate
any added volume. There is thus a need to concentrate more money at the EC level,
and to use this money better. Deciding everything with unanimity between 25
Member States is certainly not the way to reach such a result.
A similar reasoning should be applied to the economic coordination process. If
Member States consider the strengthening as necessary (which it is), they should
increase the powers of the Commission in this domain. Experience has shown quite
                                                
36 On the link between the reforms and the OMC, see G. TABELLINI et C. WYPLOSZ, Réformes structurelles
et coordination en Europe, Paris : Conseil d'analyse économique du premier ministre, 2004.
37 See R. DEHOUSSE dir., L'Europe sans Bruxelles: une analyse de la méthode ouverte de coordination, Paris :
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decisively now that giving the final powers of control and sanction to the Council is
the perfect recipe for confusion and inaction.
The decision and implementation process has not been simplified. On the contrary,
the Lisbon strategy relies heavily on the European Council, which is certainly not fit
to  manage  a  very  complex  project  of  structural  reforms.  Therefore,  the
intergovernmental characteristics of the EC method have been strengthened to
implement the broadest political project of the EU
38.
4.2. New ambitions without any budgetary impact
The debate about the Lisbon strategy has suffered from the general regressive
approach concerning the evolution of the EC budget. In some areas, for strategic or
marketing reasons, it is clear that higher budgetary commitments could have brought
better  results.  It  could  also  have  oiled  a  lot  the  mechanisms  of  economic
coordination.
The EC budget was not increased, and it was even not modified to take into
consideration the so-called "priority" of the Lisbon objectives
39. The agricultural
budget could have been reduced to provide some means for new policies. The
objectives of the structural funds could have been redefined. Such decisions were
not taken.
4.3. New ambitions without respect for existing rules
Such a new ambitious program like the Lisbon strategy is difficult to implement if
even existing and more limited commitments are not respected by the Member
States.  This  is  especially  the  case  if  this  delivery  deficit  concerns  an  area
(macroeconomic policy) which is crucial for the success of the strategy.
More generally, there is a need for greater leadership in the process of structural
reforms in  the  EU.  Sometimes, the  grandiloquent statements of  the  European
Council seemed to be considered by national leaders as a substitute for action.
There is a need for greater – and regular – initiatives at the national level. The Lisbon
strategy is built on the idea of a strong synergy between the EC and the Member
States.  This  synergy  cannot  exist  without  more  commitment  by  the  national
                                                
38  See DEBARGE, LAURENT and RABAEY, Le rôle du Conseil européen : influences croisées dans les
champs économiques et sociaux, in GIEPI, Quel avenir pour l'Union européenne ? La stratégie de Lisbonne
définie par le Conseil européen en 2000, Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2004, pp. 41-75 ; CAFARO, La méthode ouverte
de coordination, l'action politique communautaire et le rôle politique du Conseil européen, in Mélanges J.V.
Louis, vol. II, Bruxelles : éd. de l'ULB, 2004, pp. 203-221.
39 See LEROY, L'avenir de la politique structurelle régionale de l'Europe, in GIEPI, Quel avenir pour l'Union
européenne ? La stratégie de Lisbonne définie par le Conseil européen en 2000, Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2004, pp.
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governments. The EC is not different from the Member States. The Member States
are the EC. This should be said – and practiced.Lisbon Strategy TZ KH 22032005 20
5. TEN WAYS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SITUATION
5.1. Explain better
The causes of the strategy are complex, and so is the strategy itself. Consequently, it
needs a lot of explanation – preferably as simple as possible. The Commission
rightly drew the attention on this in its communication. Nevertheless, it has not
always respected itself this requirement. Things could be better. There should be (a)
a stronger emphasis on the main objectives, (b) a more positive description of
specific EC initiatives during the period 2000-2005, (c) a clearer indication of the
main responsibility of national governments.
In that perspective, it would be most useful to change the name of the program. A
better communication strategy requires a clear name. This is not presently the case.
There have been some hints in that direction. Nevertheless, the Commission still
suggests the nomination of a "Mr Lisbon" in all national capitals. This is certainly a
good name for a tour operator, but not for a person in charge of economic structural
reforms.
5.2. Underline the positive aspects
In  some  ways,  the  EU's  economic  performance  has  been  substantially  less
catastrophic than many present descriptions suggest. The Lisbon strategy has also
delivered results at the EC level and even in a limited way at the national level.
5.3. Organize national debates
If  the  national  governments  really  support  the  strategy,  they  should  commit
themselves  to  organize  one  yearly  parliamentary  debate,  involving  the  social
partners, about the implementation of the strategy.
5.4. Invest one member of the European Commission of the communication
regarding the strategy
The coordination of the Lisbon strategy's implementation at the national level is a
good suggestion. Coordination begins at home, so the Commission should follow its
own advice at its own level. Many commissioners have a stake in the strategy, but
the information and the relations with national debates should be entrusted to one
person.
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The social and environmental objectives did not prevent any initiative. Abandoning
them will not simplify much the official documents and will not reduce the burdens of
the national administrations. On the other side, this will certainly increase strongly
the resistances against structural reforms.
5.6. Relaunch the growth and stability pact
Though this may seem paradoxical, the correct functioning of the stability pact is an
essential condition of the Lisbon strategy's success. The new emphasis of the
Commission on this point is thus most welcome. Firstly, it will be difficult to extend
the scope of economic coordination if its most important form in the present state of
the treaties does not function. Secondly, a better macroeconomic environment would
strongly facilitate the process of structural reforms in the Member States.
5.7. Strengthen the control of the EU on national statistics
The drastic review of Greece's statistics and various accountancy conflicts with other
Member States have revealed the parlous state of European statistics. Something
must be done about this, otherwise it will be difficult to track the real state of affairs in
many Member States.
5.8. Renew the tripartite agreement with the ECB
In 1999, the Cologne European Council launched a tripartite dialog between the EC
political authorities, the social partners and the ECB. The ECB should support growth
in the Eurozone a little bit more, but it would be much more easy if it got insurances
about possible pressures on prices coming from national deficits or salaries.
5.9. Put EC money where the EC mouth is
Incentives have the marvelous ability to smoothen the path of reform. It would thus
be very efficient to modify the priorities of the present EC budget outlays. It would still
be better of course to increase their global level a little bit. This would be quite a
good long term investment.
5.10. Envisage future use of qualified majority voting in the EC domains
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In the present situation of the EU, unanimity is the perfect recipe for paralysis.
Everybody knows it. If the national governments are serious about the Lisbon
strategy, they should contemplate the extension of the qualified majority vote in
specific priority areas.